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Soros’s Reflexivity Concept in a Complex World: Cauchy 
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Abstract: George Soros makes an important analytical contribution to understanding the concept of 
reflexivity in social science by explaining reflexivity in terms of how his cognitive and manipulative 
causal functions are connected to one another by a pair of feedback loops (Soros, 2013).  Here I put 
aside the issue of how the natural sciences and social sciences are related, an issue he discusses, and 
focus on how his thinking applies in economics.  I argue that standard economics assumes a 
‘classical’ view of the world in which knowledge and action are independent, but that we live in a 
complex reflexive world in which knowledge and action are interdependent.  I argue Soros’s view 
provides a reflexivity critique of the efficient market hypothesis seen as depending on untenable 
claims about the nature of random phenomena and the nature of economic agents.  Regarding the 
former, I develop this critique in terms of Cauchy distributions; regarding the latter I develop it in 
terms of rational expectations and rational addiction reasoning.  
Keywords: Soros, reflexivity, efficient market hypothesis, Cauchy distributions, rational 
expectations, rational addiction 
JEL codes: B41, D84, G14 
 
1 Soros’s cognitive and manipulative causal functions 
                                                          
1 Thanks go to Wade Hands and Cars Hommes for comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also go to the 
Central European University, George Soros, Eric Beinhocker, and participants in the Workshop on Reflexivity, October 
8, 2013, where this paper was presented. 
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Soros’s analysis explains reflexivity in terms of how cognitive and manipulative causal functions are 
connected to one another by a pair of feedback loops (Soros, 2013).  The cognitive function 
concerns our knowledge of the world and the role that the world itself plays in determining our 
knowledge of it.  The manipulative function concerns action and how people’s motivations given 
their knowledge of the world determine their actions.  His method of explanation is to have us first 
imagine each function as if it operated in isolation from the other, and then have us see how that 
function is modified by a feedback loop from the other function.   
(i)  In the case of the cognitive or knowledge function, the direction of causation is from the world to the 
mind.  Taken in isolation, our knowledge of the world is determined by what the world is 
independently of us, as if what the world is were fully independent of our actions:   
world → mind  (1) 
But in a complex reflexive world the manipulative or action function interferes with the cognitive 
function because people act on what they know, action changes what the world is, and thus changes 
knowledge.  Action thus has a feedback effect on knowledge so that: 
world ← mind  (2) 
So it incorrect to say as in (1) that the world is fully independent of us and independently determines 
our knowledge of it.  The main direction of causation when we think of knowledge is still from the 
world to the mind, but the feedback loop from action in (2) produces a reverse causation that 
modifies the world and thus knowledge.2  The cognitive function modified by manipulative function 
might thus be represented as:  
world → mind [world ← mind] 
                  or             (3) 
‘world → mind’ 
(ii)  In the case of the manipulative function, the direction of causation is from the mind to the world.  
Taken in isolation, people act on what they know as if their motivations in doing so were fully 
independent of their actions.   
                                                          
2 Positive feedback effects of action on knowledge that reinforce knowledge have been termed self-fulfilling prophecies 
(Merton, 1948).  
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mind → world  (4) 
But the cognitive function interferes with this because acting on the world also produces knowledge 
about one’s motivations for acting, so that the basis for action is changed.   
mind ← world  (5) 
So action depends not only on our motivations as in (4) but also on how our motivations change as 
we learn about them in acting upon the world as in (5), and so it is incorrect to say that the basis for 
action is independent of our actions.  The main direction of causation is still from mind to the world 
– our motivations still basically drive our actions – but the feedback loop involving the reverse 
causation from knowledge gained in acting modifies motivation.3  The manipulative function 
modified by cognitive function might thus be represented as: 
mind → world [mind ← world] 
                  or    (6)  
‘mind → world’ 
(iii)  Putting these two functions together with their respective feedback effects – the cognitive 
function modified by the manipulative one (3) and the manipulative function is modified by the 
cognitive one (6) – we have the following schema in a complex reflexive world: 
 ‘world → mind’  and  ‘mind → world’  (7) 
Thus, Soros explains reflexivity analytically by first isolating the two basic causal relationships 
concerning knowledge and action, and then showing how they are modified and interconnected by 
two separate feedback relationships. 
 
2 A ‘classical’ world vs. a complex reflexive world: The efficient market hypothesis 
(i)  Soros reasons that what I call a ‘classical’ view of the world, in which knowledge and action are 
independent and can be investigated separately from one another, is an untenable simplification in a 
                                                          
3 This second form of reflexivity is less commonly discussed, in no small part because it is associated with endogenous 
preferences, a subject assiduously left outside standard economics.  
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complex reflexive world of two-way feedback loops.  His analysis offers two linked dimensions 
through which reflexivity can be investigated.   
The first is an epistemological one in which the focus is the modified cognitive/knowledge function 
as in (3), and where the main subject of investigation is the fallibility of scientific knowledge.  Soros 
points out that there are multiple epistemic sources of fallibility associated with the complexity of 
the world and the structure of the brain (p. 5).  I associate the first with radical uncertainty (in the 
Keynes-Knight sense) and the latter with bounded rationality (in the Simon sense).  But Soros’s 
principle message in his contribution to this issue is that the reflexive feedback principle associated 
with how the manipulative function modifies the cognitive one is the fundamental source of the 
fallibility of scientific knowledge.   
The second dimension of the analysis is an ontological one where the focus is the modified 
manipulative/action function as in (6), and the main subject of investigation is how agents act in a 
world of radical uncertainty.  Uncertainty is often seen as an epistemological concept associated with 
the impossibility of knowing the future.4  But it also needs to be seen as an ontological concept 
associated with not having a basis for action.5  Soros also points out that there are multiple sources 
of uncertainty, but again his principle message in his paper here emphasizes the special role of 
reflexivity, or how feedback from the cognitive function interferes with the manipulative one in 
unsettling the basis for action.   
The ‘classical’ view of the world of standard economics, then, entails an epistemology and ontology 
in which knowledge and action are independent.6  Since this is the world in which the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) applies, Soros’s reflexivity analysis should show us why the EMH cannot 
apply in a complex reflexive world.   
                                                          
4 As J. M. Keynes put it: “The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on which our 
estimates of prospective yield have to be made. Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an 
investment some years hence is usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that our 
basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the goodwill of a 
patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of London amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even 
five years hence” (1936, pp. 149-50; emphasis added). 
5 As Keynes also put it: “Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will 
be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action 
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative 
probabilities” (1936, p. 161; emphasis added). 
6 The ‘classical’ view of the world entails a natural science view of social science.  In natural science, human action does 
not change the laws of nature, so the cognitive function is unmodified by the manipulative one.  Thus standard 
economics employs a natural science view of social science. 
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The EMH, whether in its strong, semi-strong, or weak versions, basically says that in financial 
markets agents use ‘all available information’ about market prices efficiently.  Behavioral finance 
economists generally argue this does not occur because people are subject to various psychological 
imperfections in reasoning or heuristics and biases that distort their information processing.  Soros 
accepts this but for him the main reason the EMH is wrong is more fundamental: it ignores 
reflexivity.  On the one hand, the EMH assumes traders’ cognitive function is not modified by the 
manipulative function (1), and that accordingly ‘all available information’ can be reasonably taken to 
correspond to the way the world is.  But, Soros tells us, the operation of financial markets affects 
what the world is because trading can distort the so-called underlying asset fundamentals which 
market prices are thought to reflect (2).  So it is incorrect to say that ‘all available information’ 
corresponds to the way the world is independently of us.  That is, traders’ cognitive function is 
modified by their manipulative one (3).  On the other hand, the EMH assumes traders’ manipulative 
function is not modified by the cognitive function (4), from which it follows that traders are, as it 
were, motivationally complete (or have complete preferences).  But, Soros tells us, turning points in 
boom-bust processes or other price cycles provide traders information about the consequences of 
their actions, which can change attitudes, and thus change traders’ motivations.  So it is incorrect to 
say that traders have ‘all available information’ when they set out to make any given set of trades 
since that information does not include information about how their motivations will change, or 
how their manipulative function is modified by their cognitive one (6). 
The EMH is wrong, then, because it ignores the two-way feedback loops that operate on the two 
causal functions (7), whereas proponents of the EMH assume we live in a simple ‘classical’ world in 
which knowledge and action are independent of one another so that their effects can be investigated 
separately.  This ‘classical’ thinking rests on two questionable ontological claims, one pertaining to 
the nature of random phenomena (the random walk hypothesis) and the other pertaining to the 
nature of economic agents (the expected utility conception).  Consider first the claim about the 
nature of random phenomena.     
 
i The random walk hypothesis 
The random walk hypothesis says that stock prices evolve in a random manner and thus cannot be 
predicted.  Randomly distributed phenomena which are normally or bell-shaped distributed possess 
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determinate means and finite variance, and these properties are needed to be able to say that 
economics agents can use all available information efficiently.  So the random walk hypothesis 
requires normally distributed stock prices.  In contrast, if random phenomena have a Cauchy 
distribution (a family of fat tail distributions), mean and variance are undefined, and it no longer 
makes sense to say that economics agents use all available information efficiently.  The ‘classical’ 
view of the world and the EMH rule out Cauchy distributions by assumption, but the recent 
financial crisis seems to have shown that stock prices are not always normally distributed.  That is, 
one of the clear lessons of the crisis is that fat tail ‘extreme’ events, that is, phenomena which are 
rare when we assume normal distributions, are somehow not all that rare after all.   
Suppose, then, that stock prices can be Cauchy-distributed with undefined means and variances.  
Why we might suppose this can be explained in terms of Soros’s understanding of reflexivity in 
terms of the modified cognitive and manipulative functions (3 and 6).  Soros’s view is that the two 
functions are dominant causal processes that are only modified by feedback loops.  Thus it is can 
easily appear that the pure cognitive function (1) and the pure manipulative function (4) accurately 
represent the phenomena (particularly when methods of observation are imperfect).  Note, then, 
that normal distributions presuppose the Central Limit Theorem, which says that for a sufficiently 
large number of observations of a phenomenon the distribution of the phenomena converges on a 
normal distribution.  But when the cognitive and manipulative functions are modified by two-way 
feedback (7), in reality the phenomena are changed, and so there no longer are a large number of the 
identical phenomenon.  Soros thus tells us that the fundamentals behind stock prices change in 
trading, but his view is actually more subtle.  It is that fundamentals are most of the time only 
modestly changed by the action of traders so that they may well appear not to have changed at all (at 
least until boom and bust processes become undeniable).  So it may appear that the phenomena are 
the same and unchanged, the central limit theorem applies, and random phenomena are normally 
distributed when in fact this is not the case. 
Indeed, this deceptive combination of the appearance of normality and the emergence of crisis is 
reflected in the idea of a fat tail ‘extreme’ event occurrence.  How can an ‘extreme’ event both be 
truly not rare (because it occurs more frequently than expected) and nonetheless still be regarded as 
‘extreme’?  The answer is that reflexive worlds mask their rare but nonetheless very possible non-
normal behavior with the appearance of normality, because feedback relationships only modify 
market actors’ pure cognitive and pure manipulative functions gradually and often imperceptibly.  
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Nonetheless these feedback effects can still be real and cumulative, and market phenomena – 
particularly where there are increasingly strong incentives for agents to act on their knowledge and 
affect the phenomena – should accordingly not be regarded as always normally distributed.  Thus 
the EMH thus rests on a mistaken claim about claim about random phenomena.  
 
ii The Homo economicus expected utility conception 
Now consider what the EMH requires about the nature of economic agents.  There are two sides to 
the standard conception: the probabilities and knowledge side and the preferences and motivation 
side.  On the former, the Homo economicus expected utility individual conception is objectivist about 
probabilities and knowledge.  It assumes that learning occurs in a Bayesian way given common 
priors.7  Everyone starts with the same knowledge of the world, and people acquire different 
posterior beliefs according to their differential experience.  Further, since expected utility depends 
on forecasts of future prices, and since forecasts are subject to error, the standard view crucially also 
assumes that errors in forecasting are uncorrelated across agents, so that one can aggregate individual 
expectations into a representative agent rational forecast – the rational expectations hypothesis – and 
say that people acquire objective knowledge about the world because on average they use 
probabilistic information efficiently (see Hommes, 2013).  Bayesianism thus employs a pure 
cognitive function feedback analysis since the assumption that forecasting errors are uncorrelated 
leaves this up-dating process fully in the domain of probabilities and knowledge, and the cognitive 
function is unmodified by the manipulative one (1). 
One way in which this view has been contested in reflexivity terms is through the development of 
bounded rationality agent conceptions employing expectations feedback systems with correlated 
forecasting errors.  In terms of Soros’s framework, expectations feedback systems with correlated 
forecasting errors show how agents’ cognitive function – here their forecasting function – is 
modified by the manipulative one (3).  If agents’ forecasts are correlated, they do not balance out on 
average (ruling out the representative agent rational forecast), and what people do (the actions they 
undertake) changes the overall pattern of future forecasts.  This rules out the ‘classical’ rational 
expectations view that knowledge and action are independent.  It also rules out the important 
associated assumption that agents are independent with respect to knowledge.  Soros brings out this 
                                                          
7 See Morris (1995) for a critical discussion of the common prior probability distribution assumption. 
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latter assumption in his emphasis on interaction between multiple agents.  Brock and Hommes 
(1997, 1998) have developed this framework in systematic way by introducing heterogeneous 
expectations into expectations feedback systems with correlated forecasting errors, and by showing 
that when agents revise their forecasts of future prices, and switch back and forth between different 
forecasting rules based on their relative performance, excess volatility with bubbles and crashes in 
asset markets can result.8  
But bounded rationality analysis strictly concerns knowledge and belief; that is, how the cognitive 
function is modified by the manipulative one (3).  A quite different and often overlooked reflexivity 
analysis applies on the preferences and motivation side of the expected utility conception where the 
issue is how the manipulative function is modified by the cognitive one 6).  The Homo economicus 
conception, then, is objectivist about probabilities and knowledge, but subjectivist about preferences 
and motivation.  Utilities are fully personal.  In contrast to the common priors assumption on the 
knowledge and probabilities side, people’s preferences have no common basis and are individual-
specific (though people can accidentally happen to have the same preferences).  This has meant for 
most standard economists that agents have no preference adjustment process, process of preference 
formation, or preference feedback system, analogous to expectations feedback systems.  Generally 
speaking, saying preferences are subjective means they have an exogenous character, or are given 
and unchanging.9   
But looked at more closely, this is an odd conception.  It assumes that a person’s preferences 
constitute a finite set, and, according to the completeness axiom, are sufficient to evaluate all choice 
opportunities.  People encounter new choices but since their preferences do not change, they must 
evaluate these new choices by means of the same preferences they employed to evaluate their past 
choices.    Agents’ given preferences, then, are not specific to the circumstance of choice, but have a 
kind of general, all-purpose nature or versatility for making an infinite number of possible choices.  
A particular preference x, that is, can be exercised to make any number of different choices A, B, … 
                                                          
8 See Hommes (2013) for a discussion of the literature on expectations feedback systems as a response to rational 
expectations modeling.  Note that agents change their mix of forecasting rules but do not change the motivational basis 
of their choices.  The analysis is still reflexive in a way that Bayesianism is not because action feeds back onto belief.  
Hommes stresses the fact that in positive expectations feedback systems non-rational almost self-fulfilling equilibria with 
correlated forecasts easily arise. 
9 Stigler and Becker (1977) influentially argued that preferences, like the “Rocky Mountains” are just there, and thus 
essentially do not change.  This assumption serves to isolate the effects of changes in prices and incomes on choice, and 
gives a market-driven analysis of choice.  They also feared that if were explained by changing preference, the explanation 
of choice would become hopelessly confused by competing theories of human psychology. 
9 
 
N, though those choices can differ substantially due to differences in the person’s information about 
the circumstances of choice.  We might thus ask: why should preference x provide the means for 
making any particular choice versus any other choice?  That is, what explains its versatility?  The 
answer is that since preferences are subjective, that is, essentially unexplainable, this question simply 
cannot be raised.   
One way, then, in which it may seem this view has been contested is in the analysis of fads, fashion, 
and related consumer phenomena as found in the recent literature on information cascades and 
‘herding’ behavior (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992).  But these models 
are explanations of ‘rational’ herding behavior, where agents substitute public information for 
private information, and preferences are unaffected by choice.  Thus they only concern a pure 
cognitive function (1), and tell us nothing about how the manipulative function is modified by the 
cognitive one (6) – which would seem to be the point of talking about fads and fashion. 
Where the manipulative function has actually been the focus is in an older literature on endogenous 
preference.  Preferences are endogenous and an intertemporal preference formation process – a 
preference feedback system – exists when individuals’ preferences somehow depend on their past 
choices.  Here, however, the standard analysis – the ‘rational addiction’ model (Becker and Murphy, 
1988) – assumes individuals’ preferences are dynamically consistent across time in that their later 
preference sets are rationally derived from their earlier ones.  This rules out the possibility that a 
person might have dynamically inconsistent preferences, and dissolve into a series of disconnected 
multiple selves each associated with a different set of (present-biased) preferences.  It essentially 
allows the endogenous preference feedback system to operate as if the person’s preferences over 
time were the person’s representative individual preferences.10  This analogue or preference side 
representative individual conception also isolates the person’s preference change process from the 
influence of other individuals, and thus essentially employs a pure manipulative function (4).  Thus it 
also fails to get at Soros’s understanding of reflexivity.      
However, recent behavioral economics research provides strong evidence that people commonly 
employ hyperbolic rather than exponential time rates of discount, and thus exhibit present-bias in 
decision-making (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue, 2002).  This implies that their 
preferences are dynamically inconsistent, that people effectively function as successions of multiple 
                                                          
10 In effect, it is as if the person’s different preference sets over time are ‘uncorrelated’ in the sense of sustaining dynamic 
consistency of choice of the person’s representative individual.   
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selves, and that a rational addiction representative individual assumption is not a reasonable way to 
model preference feedback systems and endogenous preference.11  Thus, in the multiple selves time-
inconsistent behavior literature (e.g., Laibson, 1997) no such assumption is employed, present-bias is 
interpreted as a lack of self-control (on the part of the representative individual planner self), and 
people are said to be reliant on external commitment devices, such as mandated 401(k) plans, to 
overcome present-bias.  Recall that on Soros’s understanding of how the manipulative function is 
modified by the cognitive one that the motivational basis for action is not independent of our 
actions; that is, we learn about ourselves when we act and this subsequently changes our motivations 
for acting.  It might be argued, then, that generally people become aware of their present-bias and its 
sometimes unhappy consequences, and are then disposed to avail themselves of external 
commitment devices in forming future preferences.  In this way the individual’s preference feedback 
system functions in such a way that the manipulative function can be said to be modified by the 
cognitive one (6). 
More certainly needs to be said about the nature of endogenous preferences to adequately explain 
preference feedback systems.  But in closing this section I simply note that replacing the expected 
utility individual conception with a reflexive individual conception depends on bringing together the 
two sides of the agent discussed above.  That is, a full reflexivity account of agents would need to 
integrate expectations feedback systems and preference feedback systems by showing how each acts 
upon the other, and thus how both the cognitive and manipulative functions modify each another in 
a two-way feedback system.   
 
3 Reflexivity and the EMH 
Soros’s analysis makes an important analytical contribution by explaining reflexivity as a two-way 
feedback system between knowledge and action.   The basic idea is that people acquire knowledge, 
act on what they know, this changes the world and what they can know about it, and also changes 
what they know about the basis for action and how they will subsequently act.  This means there are 
always both ‘new’ things true about the world and ‘new grounds for action, and that time’s arrow 
                                                          
11 When individuals exhibit present-bias, their preferences are no longer uncorrelated over time but rather correlated 
around periods. 
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has a one-way direction.12  This is ruled out in the ‘classical’ world of the EMH in which knowledge 
and action lack feedback channels.  In standard economics, this is reflected in how the random walk 
hypothesis and the Homo economicus expected utility conception – the two pillars on which the EMH 
depends – assume that the phenomena of the world and economic agents constitute two bracketed-
off ontologically independent domains. 
Homo economicus →   EMH   ← random walk 
↓                                      ↓ 
                                                   [agents]               [phenomena of the world] 
 
But in a complex economic world with reflexive feedback relationships between knowledge and 
action, agents and the phenomena of the world are ontologically interdependent and mutually 
influencing: 
agents    ↔    phenomena of the world 
This is the vision Soros employs.  Setting out this alternative ontological conception, then, is part of 
what is involved in explaining what reflexivity in economics entails. 
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